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Perspectives on Australian bankruptcy law through the prism of the World 
Bank report on the treatment of the insolvency of natural persons 
Professor Rosalind Mason∗ and Stephen O’Mahony# 
The insolvency of natural persons raises questions not only for a nation’s economy but also 
for its concern for equity. The World Bank has recently released a Report on the Treatment of 
the Insolvency of Natural Persons to guide nations in addressing the issues raised by an 
individual debtor’s insolvency. A brief review of Australia’s personal insolvency laws shows 
that it addresses many of the issues raised by the Report. However two areas are identified as 
worthy of further investigation by policy-makers and scholars to better address a concern for 
equity.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The insolvency of natural persons, ie, an individual’s inability to pay debts such that 
collective action is required, raises some different policy and regulatory issues to those which 
apply where a legal entity, typically a company, is insolvent.  This is the case whether 
personal insolvency is addressed through sequestration of the debtor’s estate or through a 
formal arrangement with creditors to accept, say, a payment plan in discharge of their debts.   
Personal insolvency law and practice1 must deal with the human dimension of overwhelming 
debt. This raises specific issues for the debtor him or herself that do not arise in a corporate 
insolvency, such as exempt household property and discharge from or ‘life after’ bankruptcy.  
The human dimension may also extend to the debtor’s family, as recognised in Australia 
where the calculation of a bankrupt’s income contributions to the estate includes 
consideration of their dependants.  
In January 2011, the World Bank2 (whose overarching mission is to reduce poverty)3 for the 
first time asked its Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force to consider personal 
insolvency.  A meeting in Washington included two sessions on Best Practices in the 
Insolvency of Natural Persons,4 examining both the diversity in the treatment of insolvent 
natural persons and the need for the development of insolvency regimes for natural persons 
and the link to credit expansion and financial stability.  The Task Force noted the importance 
to the international financial architecture of the modernisation of domestic laws and 
institutions in place to deal with the risk of personal indebtedness, in particular, in light of the 
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4Susan Block-Lieb, Rapporteur’s Synopsis, The World Bank Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task 
Force Meeting (11 January 2011) 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/WB_TF_2011_Consumer_Insolvency.pdf .   
recent financial crisis.  It noted that while it was important to recognise the diversity in 
domestic policy and values in respect of this issue, globalisation and expansion of access to 
finance had changed the character and scale of the risk of consumer insolvency in many 
similar ways across the world.5 
During 2011, the World Bank and the Task Force established a working group to examine the 
issue of natural person insolvency and produce a “reflective” report “suggesting guidance for 
the treatment of the different issues involved, taking into account different policy options and 
the diverse sensitivities around the world”.6  In December 2012, the drafting committee7 
presented on the issues and main topics to be included in the report.  Subsequently the World 
Bank Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons was issued “to help 
policymakers develop a better sense of the social and economic benefits of some of the 
modern approaches to the regulation of the insolvency of natural persons.”8 
 
This article provides an overview of the Report’s findings, in particular the core legal 
attributes of an insolvency regime for natural persons and briefly comments on the presence 
or otherwise of these attributes in Australia’s personal insolvency regime.  It then explores 
two issues highlighted by this review of Australia’s regime as worthy of consideration by 
policy-makers and scholars when examining ways to improve Australian personal insolvency 
law.  They are (i) the relevance of ‘acts of bankruptcy’ in a modern bankruptcy law and (ii) 
the treatment of a debtor’s home in a bankruptcy.  
 
II. WORLD BANK REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY OF NATURAL 
PERSONS 
 
A. Background 
The Report’s main objective is “to provide guidance on the characteristics of an effective 
insolvency regime for natural persons and on the opportunities and challenges encountered in 
the development of such a regime.”  It does not seek to identify “best practice”, but rather to 
provide guidance on “policy issues”, 9  exploring the advantages and disadvantages of 
solutions to the numerous practical issues that have to be confronted. 
By the term ‘insolvency’, the Report means “any system for alleviating the burdens of 
excessive debt and allocating benefits and losses, both among creditors and as between 
creditors and natural person debtors”.10  Essentially, it sees insolvency regimes for natural 
persons as: 
a final stage of the enforcement system, in particular the procedural regime for enforcing 
obligations and property rights. Less directly, but no less importantly, [they] implicate salient 
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issues of data protection and personal privacy, as well as a host of social and economic 
regulatory issues such as individual counseling, education, social welfare provision, and 
family and housing policy. Both practically and as a matter of legal policy, financial distress 
and insolvency are inextricably linked with credit extension, banking, taxation, and business 
entrepreneurship, as well as with the more fundamental laws of contractual and delictual 
obligations and property—and the interaction of the obligations and property regimes.11  
The Report limits the scope of its discussion of insolvency regimes for natural persons, to: 
(a) the treatment of already existing insolvency, not the prevention of insolvency; and  
(b) The treatment of insolvency, not poverty.  
It describes insolvency regimes as “less like social assistance, and more like social insurance, 
protecting individuals from financial tragedy.” 12   To address the definitional issues of 
differentiating between the ‘pure’ consumer debtor versus those debtors engaged in business, 
it focuses on the “issues most implicated by the ‘human factor’ inherent in any insolvency 
case involving a natural person as debtor.”13  However the Report does not ignore the fact 
that insolvency relief for natural persons also includes “a powerful element of economic 
concern.”14  In particular, it acknowledges that natural persons are commonly burdened with 
heavy debt when business ventures fail, either from debts incurred in businesses carried out 
in their own name or being made personally liable for debts of companies with limited 
liability of which the individual was associated.  This is particularly relevant when 
considering how the evolving nature of many trades and occupations has resulted in the 
individual undertaking such trade on their own account, rather than as employees.15 
Benefits of an insolvency regime for natural persons fall into at least three distinct categories 
– those for creditors; for debtors and their families; and for society.  The benefits for creditors 
largely revolve around an insolvency regime being a collective approach - having an 
independent administrator who acts in the interests of all in maximising the value of assets 
and distributing them fairly among the collective of creditors.  
For debtors, an insolvency regime provides relief, for example by way of moratorium on 
creditor enforcement and by providing a solution to overwhelming financial obligations.  It 
can also extend benefits to the debtor’s family.  An insolvency regime can “provide quite 
direct and often immediate relief from the stress, anxiety, and other negative emotional and 
physical reactions associated with inability to manage debts”.16  As the Report highlights, 
there are morbidity aspects of excessive debt, such as serious physical and mental problems 
for debtors, arising from the fear and anxiety of the inability to repay debt, harassment from 
creditors and nagging feelings of failure.17 
The benefits for society, both at a national and international level, as outlined18 include: 
(a) establishment of proper account valuation; 
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(b) reduction in wasteful collection costs and destroyed value in depressed asset sales; 
(c) encouragement of responsible lending and reduction of negative externalities; 
(d) concentration of losses on more efficient and effective loss distributors; 
(e) reduction of the costs of illness, crime, unemployment and other welfare-related costs;  
(f) increased production of regular taxable income; 
(g) maximisation of economic activity and encouragement of entrepreneurship; and 
(h) enhancement of stability and predictability in the broader financial system and 
economy.  
 
B. Core legal attributes of an insolvency regime for natural persons  
Against this background, the Report proposes core legal attributes of an insolvency regime 
for natural persons, listed under 6 categories.  These are briefly described below together with 
a short commentary on the way in which the Australian regime displays many of these 
attributes.  
1 General Regime Design  
First, a formal insolvency system acts “to encourage informal negotiation and resolution, as 
creditors and debtors ‘bargain in the shadow of insolvency.”19  The Australian insolvency 
regime distinguishes between individual (or natural person) and corporate debtors.  The laws 
dealing with personal bankruptcies and alternative arrangements with creditors are to be 
found in the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) with corporate insolvency administrations regulated 
by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  This bifurcation of insolvency law has resulted in 
separate regulatory bodies for personal and corporate insolvency administrations.  Natural 
person insolvency administrations are regulated by Australian Financial Security Authority 
(AFSA) 20  established as an executive agency within the Attorney-General’s portfolio. 
Corporate debtor insolvency administrations are regulated by Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC).21 
The Australian personal insolvency regime favours informal and formal negotiated solutions 
between the debtor and creditors.  The Report refers to the important role that consumer and 
debt counsellors can play in advising debtors and negotiating on their behalf with creditors.22  
The AFSA website includes in its options for dealing with unmanageable debt to ask for help 
from financial counsellors.23  The ASIC website, MoneySmart, likewise refers to financial 
counselling services available around Australia under the Managing Debts tab.24 
The Australian personal insolvency regime also promotes formal alternatives to a court 
sequestration order based on a creditor’s petition through voluntary bankruptcy procedures;25 
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<http://www.asic.gov.au/>.  
22 World Bank Report above n 6, [127]. 
23 https://www.afsa.gov.au/debtors/financial-counsellors  
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encouraged by a moratorium on creditor action under Part IV Division 2A and a Declaration of Intention to 
Present a Debtor’s Petition. 
post-bankruptcy compositions;26 personal insolvency agreements;27 and debt agreements.28  
However, some of the problems that the Report identifies with informal negotiation and 
resolution resonate with the Australian experience, in particular, the intransigence of some 
creditors making negotiations impossible, the reluctance of public creditors (including tax 
authorities) to accept negotiated approaches and the general lack of incentive for many 
financial institutions to engage in meaningful negotiations meaning that in practice it is not 
easy for debtors to reach voluntary arrangements with creditors.29   
2 The institutional framework  
On the institutional framework for the insolvency of natural persons, an insolvency regime 
should “minimize overall social costs [including] error costs in determining the validity of 
debts and levels of repayment, and costs to creditors, debtors and third parties. It should 
provide timely outcomes and achieve confidence in its operation by stakeholders and the 
general public.”30  
Australia’s institutional framework reflects a well developed system of consumer and 
commercial credit with “banking regulations, procedures for the enforcement of judgment 
debts, credit reporting and data privacy regulations, financial education programs, debt 
counselling services, and housing and social welfare policy”.31  
AFSA acts as a specialist agency, responsible for the administration and regulation of the 
personal insolvency system.  Its services include ensuring compliance by debtors, bankrupts 
and their associates, practitioners and others with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Act 
1966 (Cth) and associated legislation; maintaining the National Personal Insolvency Index; 
registering all bankruptcies, debt agreements and personal insolvency agreements; and 
regulating the administrations and activity of trustees and debt agreement administrators.32  
However it also administers, as the Official Trustee, more than 80% of bankrupt estates 
annually and as such, it may not necessarily be perceived as a “neutral policeman”33 in 
ensuring public confidence in the integrity of the insolvency system.34  
3 Access to the formal insolvency regime 
Standards of access to individual insolvency and restructuring procedures should be 
“transparent and certain while ensuring against improper use by either creditor or debtor”.35  
                                                          
26 Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 73.  
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Corporate Law and Practice (Lawbook Co, 8th ed, 2013) [8.05]. 
28 Bankruptcy Act 1966 Part IX. 
29 World Bank Report above n 6, [409]. 
30 Ibid [151]. 
31 Ibid [152]. 
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33 World Bank Report above n 6, [158]. 
34 Perhaps to address such perceptions, AFSA states that the Regulation and Enforcement business area acts 
independently from AFSA’s other business areas and reports directly to the Inspector-General of Bankruptcy: 
<https://www.afsa.gov.au/about-us/introduction-to-us/business-areas/business-areas. Also see Official Trustee 
Practice Statements: <https://www.afsa.gov.au/about-us/policies-and-practices/official-trustee-practice-
statements/official-trustee-practice-statements>.  
35 World Bank Report above n 6, [185]. 
In Australia both creditors and debtors can initiate proceedings and many aspects raised by 
the Report about access are adequately addressed in Australia’s personal insolvency regime.  
One aspect that does bear consideration by policy makers, and is explored later in this article, 
is the role of “acts of bankruptcy” in the process of entry into insolvency proceedings.  Of the 
two traditional standards for entry – cessation of payments and a balance sheet test, the 
Report notes that the cessation of payments is the primary test for natural persons.  However, 
it goes on to say: 
Some countries [eg Australia] include further “acts of bankruptcy” as a trigger for an 
insolvency application. These are historical criteria that fit uneasily into contemporary 
personal insolvency law where the central issue is inability to repay rather than 
wrongful actions by debtors.36 
Some jurisdictions create high initial barriers to access, based on a debtor’s conduct. In 
Australia, access is subject to conditions, such as a minimum level of debt; a jurisdictional 
connection (not mentioned in the Report); and certain procedural requirements (including an 
“act of bankruptcy” for a creditor’s petition).  In other jurisdictions, there is more open 
access37 to the system but debtors may be sanctioned for their conduct. The Australia regime 
also includes sanctions against bankrupts.38  
4 Participation of creditors  
In a personal insolvency regime, creditors may play a more limited role in the establishment 
of a payment plan or other requirement for relief than in a corporate insolvency.39  While in 
Australia, creditors play a role in approving compositions post-bankruptcy (though some 
systems have done away with the submission and verification of creditors’ claims entirely in 
so called “assetless” bankruptcies),40 as noted above, the attitudes and relative incentives of 
creditors in pre-bankruptcy negotiations will largely influence the role that the creditors will 
play.  For instance the Report noted that in some systems tax authorities and other 
governmental actors are prohibited by law from voting to offer relief from public debts41 and 
creditor passivity may result in only a few creditors participating and so procedural 
requirements may be linked to proportions of those voting.42 
5 Solutions to the insolvency process and payment of claims  
Payment of creditors’ claims has historically been through the liquidation and distribution of 
the debtor’s estate and, more recently, through some contribution from a debtor’s future 
income.  
                                                          
36 Ibid [187]. 
37 Under open access “an individual who meets an insolvency test such as inability to pay debts as they fall due” 
without more may gain access to an insolvency procedure permitting an ultimate discharge of debts: World 
Bank Report above n 6, [188]. 
38 For example, bankruptcy offences (such as Bankruptcy Act s 265(8)) and the extension of the period of 
bankruptcy through objection to discharge (see Bankruptcy Act s 149B ff). 
39 World Bank Report above n 6, [208]. 
40 Ibid [216]. 
41 Ibid [213]. 
42 For example, in Australia acceptance of a debt agreement must be by a majority in value of the creditors who 
reply by the deadline (Bankruptcy Act s 185EC). 
In Australia a bankrupt’s estate is realised and distributed to creditors however, as the debtor 
requires assets with which to support themselves and their families, there is a list of exempt 
property.43  Australia adopts the generally held principle that exemptions do not interfere 
with security interests granted over assets that otherwise would be exempt44 and it includes in 
the bankrupt’s estate after-acquired property up to discharge. 45   Another area in which 
Australia differs from some jurisdictions, and which is explored later in the article, is that 
there is no exemption for the family home.46 
Contemporary issues around exemptions include their extent (in light of the modern trend of 
enabling debtors to have a true fresh start); 47 and questions of efficiency (because “the 
administrative costs incurred in liquidating low-value assets rarely represent an efficient use 
of resources”).48  
Australia has also adopted payment of claims through income contribution. Insolvency 
regimes “commonly require some contribution from debtors’ future income in exchange for 
whatever benefit the system offers (usually a discharge of unpaid debt)”.49  In designing a 
regime, relevant factors to consider include what counts as income (actual or projected) and 
as expenses - for example necessities required for a dignified existence.50  The Australian 
system51 appears more workable than some proposed in the Report.  
6 Discharge 
A principal purpose of a personal insolvency regime is “to re-establish the debtor’s economic 
capability, in other words, economic rehabilitation”.52  The Report describes three elements 
of rehabilitation: (i) freedom from excessive debt (the most effective being “a fresh start”);53 
(ii) non-discrimination (equal treatment with non-debtors after receiving relief); and (iii) an 
ability to avoid becoming excessively indebted again.54 
Unless discharge is respected after the insolvency procedure has concluded, the benefits of a 
fresh start may be illusory for a debtor.  The Report refers to two other elements as ancillary 
support for the concepts of discharge and rehabilitation: 
                                                          
43 The Report refers to three different approaches for deciding which property may be exempted: World Bank 
Report above n 6, [222 ff]. Australia has adopted the second approach: setting out categories of particular assets 
(and values) for these assets that the debtor may seek to get exempted.   
44 World Bank Report above n 6, [228]. 
45 Ibid [257]. 
46 Ibid [240]. 
47 Ibid [254]. 
48 Ibid [256]. A minority of regimes has all but excluded no income, no assets debtors from relief: [298]. 
49 Ibid [261]. 
50 One jurisdiction includes charges for the use of mobile phones and internet access: Ibid [296]. 
51 See Bankruptcy Act Part VI Division 4B and for a general description: 
<https://www.afsa.gov.au/debtors/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-overview/employment-income-contributions>  
52 World Bank Report above n 6, [359]. 
53 Historically this has meant a straight discharge (freed without a payment plan), however now some 
jurisdictions, including Australia, have an “earned fresh start”. For example, discharge occurs after a partial 
repayment of debt or at least 3-5 years of income contribution: World Bank Report above n 6, [361]. 
54 This may require some attempt to change debtors’ attitudes concerning proper credit use: World Bank Report 
above n 6, [359]. There is a growing interest in financial education and some jurisdictions require debtors to 
engage with budget and debt counsellors. 
(1) The principle of non-discrimination - “discrimination issues have rarely been 
discussed in this context and there seems to be no explicit prohibition against 
discrimination in most laws addressing the insolvency of natural persons.”55  
(2) The inculcation of a more healthy and responsible use of credit56 – as a goal and a 
result of debt relief procedure, this is much more difficult to achieve or measure.57   
One limitation on rehabilitation can be the scope of claims that are discharged.  In Australia, 
some debts that are not created in the market context are excluded – such as sums payable 
under child maintenance agreements; penalties and fines; certain student loans.58  
C. Summary 
In summary then, many of the core legal attributes of an insolvency regime for natural 
persons proposed by the Report are present in the Australian personal insolvency regime and 
the advantages and disadvantages of various solutions to practical issues faced by such 
regimes resonate with the Australian experience.  
Some aspects of the Report’s guidance on policy issues are worthy of further research and 
consideration by Australian policy-makers and scholars. In particular:  
• Is there still a role for acts of bankruptcy, eg in access to bankruptcy; determination of 
the commencement of bankruptcy; identification of the bankrupt’s divisible estate; 
and as evidence of ‘insolvency’ in the context of a failed attempt at a personal 
insolvency agreement?  
• Should a bankrupt’s family home be treated differently under Australia’s exempt 
property provisions?  
These are now addressed in more detail.  
 
III. ACCESS TO THE FORMAL BANKRUPTCY REGIME: ACTS OF BANKRUPTCY  
 
A feature of Australian personal insolvency law is that the solvency (or otherwise) of a debtor 
is not necessarily the primary focus of inquiry when a debtor or creditor seeks the protection 
of the bankruptcy regime. This is somewhat of an anomaly and is inconsistent with the notion 
that insolvency is a financial condition where a person is unable to pay their debts such that 
insolvency should be empirically identifiable and verifiable.59   
A. Debtor’s petition: A solvency test? 
                                                          
55 World Bank Report above n 6, [365].  
56 Australia limits repeat filings of debtor’s petitions under Bankruptcy Act s 55(3AA). 
57 World Bank Report above n 6, [366].  
58 See Bankruptcy Act s 82.  
59 Duncan Henderson, ‘Inability to pay debts: where are we now?’ (2011) 24(4) Insolvency Intelligence 54. 
In Australia, voluntary bankruptcy is initiated by a debtor presenting a petition 60  to an 
Official Receiver together with a statement of affairs, which contains personal details and 
details of assets, liabilities, and income.  The Official Receiver also requires an 
acknowledgment from the debtor that they have read the prescribed information. 61   
Generally, unless the Official Receiver decides to reject the petition because it fails to comply 
with the procedural and formal requirements62 and territorial requirements,63 and assuming 
that the debtor is not party to a debt agreement or personal insolvent agreement, the Official 
Receiver must accept the petition64 and the person becomes bankrupt on the day the petition 
is accepted.   
At no point does the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) specifically state that the debtor must be able 
to satisfy any particular test of insolvency, nor does the Act state that the grounds of the 
petition must be founded in insolvency.  The grounds for a debtor’s petition are ultimately, 
compliance with the formal statutory requirements.  
While the Official Receiver has discretion to reject a debtor’s position for “abuse of process” 
this is a limited power.  To do so, the Official Receiver must be able to establish that were the 
debtor not to be made bankrupt, the debtor would be likely (either immediately or within a 
reasonable time) to be able to pay all debts specified in the statement of affairs and that 
either: (i) it appears that the debtor is unwilling to pay one or more debts to creditors (either 
generally or to a particular creditor(s)); or (ii) the debtor has been made bankrupt on a 
debtor’s petition at least 3 times previously or at least once in the previous 5 years.65 
This does not constitute a reliable mechanism to ensure that only insolvent debtors are 
voluntarily made bankrupt.  First, mere solvency is insufficient to enable the Official 
Receiver to exercise its discretion; one of the two “aggravating factors” must be present.  
Secondly, even if the circumstances are present, the power remains discretionary.  Thirdly, 
there is no requirement on the Official Receiver to consider each petition in the first place,66 
so, not only is it a discretionary power, the Official Receiver does not have to turn its mind to 
whether circumstances are such that the discretion is even exercisable in the first place.67  
Further, s 55(3AA) is only intended to capture the most obvious and blatant cases of abuse of 
                                                          
60 A debtor’s petition may be presented by an individual, by a partnership or by joint debtors (Bankruptcy Act ss 
55–57).  
61 Bankruptcy Regulation 4.11 states that, at the time of presentation of the debtor’s petition, the Official 
Receiver must give the debtor information about alternatives to and consequences of bankruptcy, sources of 
financial advice and guidance to persons facing or contemplating bankruptcy, and information about the 
debtor’s right to choose administration either by a registered trustee or the Official Trustee, and a statement 
about certain acts of bankruptcy. The Official Receiver must not accept a debtor’s petition unless the debtor has 
given a signed acknowledgment that the debtor has received and read the prescribed information. 
62 Bankruptcy Act s 55(3) gives the Official Receiver discretion to reject a petition based on inadequacies in the 
petition or statement of affairs. 
63 Bankruptcy Act s 55(2A). 
64 Bankruptcy Act s 55(4). 
65 Bankruptcy Act s 55(3AA).  
66 Bankruptcy Act s 55(3AB). 
67 William Morgan, ‘Personal Insolvency Regime Changes in the United Kingdom and Australia’ (2003) 11 
Insolvency Law Journal 221, 225.  
the system68 with one commentator suggesting that it is aimed at debtors who accumulate 
large debts (in particular tax debts), which they have the capacity to repay, but who go 
bankrupt as a means to avoid them.69  As a result, it has been argued s 55 does not introduce a 
solvency test into the debtor’s petition regime,70 and a review of the specific wording of the 
legislation supports this conclusion.  
While there is judicial commentary to the effect that the ability of debtors to procure their 
own bankruptcy should only be available to debtors who are, as a matter of fact, insolvent,71 
this has generally been in the context of considering whether or not to exercise the court’s 
discretion72 to annul an existing bankruptcy. 73  This is a discretionary power74 and is only 
invoked on an application to annul an existing bankruptcy (often on the debtor’s own 
application).  As a result, notwithstanding such judicial commentary, there is in fact no 
solvency test imposed on debtors who seek their own bankruptcy. This is particularly relevant 
when considering some of the criticisms of the bankruptcy law in particular, whether 
bankruptcy is seen as an ‘easy option’ for a debtor who has accumulated debt and wants a 
‘way out’.75  
In comparison, in England and Wales, the legislation specifically states that the sole ground 
of a debtor’s petition is an inability to pay debts.76  While this approach has not been immune 
from criticism in respect of the ‘easy’ ability for a debtor to file for bankruptcy,77 it evidences 
a focus on actual insolvency before a debtor can present a petition.  New Zealand, on the 
other hand, maintains a similar approach to the Australian legislation.78  
B. Creditor’s petition: Time to say goodbye to the act of bankruptcy? 
Compulsory bankruptcy results from a creditor’s petition for which the pre-requisites are an 
act of bankruptcy within the previous six months, a specific jurisdictional link with Australia 
and a liquidated sum of $5,000 owing by the debtor to the creditor due now or at some certain 
                                                          
68 Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 (Cth) Explanatory Memorandum, para 39.  
69 Michael Murray ‘Bankruptcy Reform Continued’ (2002) 2 (8) Insolvency Law Bulletin 134.  
70 Morgan, above n 67, 226. 
71 For example, see Re Mottee: Ex parte Mottee and Official Receiver (1977) 16 ALR 129.  
72 A person can apply to the court for it to exercise its discretion to annul a bankruptcy pursuant to Bankruptcy 
Act s 153B.  This can be on the grounds that either (i) that the Official Receiver should not have accepted the 
petition; or (ii) the debtor’s petition should not have been presented in the first place. Case law suggests that 
annulment on the first ground is limited to situations where the procedural requirements were not complied with, 
see Orix Australia Corporation Ltd v McCormick (2005) 145 CLR 244. However the second ground can be 
made out if it can be shown that the bankrupt was not in fact insolvent at the time of the debtor’s petition.   
73 Re Almassy (1999) 92 FCR 597, [14] and see Dubow v Official Receiver [2013] FMCA 217. 
74 However, the case law seems to provide little guidance as to the grounds upon which that discretion should be 
exercised.  For example, in Seeger v Seeger [2000] FCA 732, the fact that the debtor was solvent at the time the 
debtor’s petition was presented, on its own seemed to be sufficient justification for Dowsett J to annul the 
bankruptcy.   
75 Indeed concern over the perceived bias towards debtors in the legislation and a desire to encourage debtors to 
think more seriously about the decision to become bankrupt was a specific policy consideration behind the 
Bankruptcy Amendment Bill 2002, see n 70 para 2.  
76 Insolvency Act 1986 (England and Wales) s 272(1).  
77 Harold Godwin, ‘Are Bankruptcy Proceedings Becoming Too Easy?’ (2012) 156 (34) Solicitors Journal.  
78 Insolvency Act 2006 (NZ) ss 45-46. 
future time.79  The most common act of bankruptcy relied upon is a failure to comply with a 
bankruptcy notice.80  
Effectively, a creditor seeking to bankrupt a debtor is not complaining of the debtor’s 
inability to pay debts per se, instead the creditor is complaining about the act of bankruptcy 
committed by the debtor.81  Thus the insolvency of the debtor is shown, not by the inability to 
pay the debt owed, but by the effectively unrelated act of bankruptcy.82  The practical effect 
of this is that the courts look at the act of bankruptcy as the indicator of a person’s 
insolvency, rather than any specified and verifiable inability to pay debts.83  This approach to 
an insolvency test has been described by commentators as “rather curious”84 and “quaint”.85  
The conceptual problem (as with debtors’ petitions) is that this approach does not reflect the 
underlying principle of bankruptcy, which is the inability of an individual to pay their debts.86  
Instead it focuses on some act of public notoriety as evidence of bankruptcy, a relic from the 
past where debt carried social stigma and public approbation.87  
England and Wales requires a more direct analysis of the actual insolvency of the individual 
before a creditor’s petition can be accepted so that a creditor must show a liquidated present 
(or future) debt of at least £750, which the debtor appears either to be unable to pay, or to 
have no reasonable prospect of being able to pay,88 creating an insolvency test based on an 
inability to pay debt.  The legislation goes on to provide that a creditor can only evidence 
such inability by establishing the existence of specific and proscribed circumstances.89  
The United Kingdom approach arose out of recommendations of the Cork Committee that the 
sole basis of an insolvency order should be the debtor’s inability to pay his or her debts.90  
                                                          
79 Bankruptcy Act ss 43 – 44. 
80 Bankruptcy Act s 40(1)(g). 
81 United Kingdom Insolvency Law Review Committee, Report on Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 8558, 
Her Majesty’s Printing Office, London, 1982, 524. 
82 Peter Walton, ‘Inability to Pay Debts:  Beyond the Point of No Return’ (2013) (2) Journal of Business Law 
212, 218. 
83 Slack v Bottoms English Solicitors [2002] FCA 1445. 
84 Walton, above n 82, 216. 
85 David Brown, ‘Law Reform in New Zealand: Towards a Trans-Tasman Insolvency Law?’ (2007) 15 
Insolvency Law Journal 148, 151. 
86 It is conceded that solvency is a defence in the event of a creditor’s petition pursuant to Bankruptcy Act s 
52(2)(a).  However, this is a discretionary power and the court has specifically stated that solvency itself will not 
void a creditor’s petition, it is simply a factor which the court may consider in determining whether to set aside a 
creditor’s petition, eg, Sarina v Council of the Shire of Wollondilly (1980) 48 FLR 372, 376-377.  From a 
conceptual point of view, this does not operate as a solvency test; a creditor is still able to present a creditor’s 
petition without first having to establish actual insolvency of the debtor.  
87 World Bank Report above n 6, [122].  
88 Insolvency Act 1986 (England and Wales) s 267(2). 
89 A creditor must establish either (i) the serving of a statutory demand on the debtor in respect of the debt owed 
and at least 3 weeks having elapsed since the demand was served and the demand having been neither complied 
with nor set aside; or (ii) execution or other process issued in respect of the debt on a judgment or order of any 
court in favour of the petitioning creditor, or one or more of the petitioning creditors to whom the debt is owed, 
having been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part. See Insolvency Act 1986 (England and Wales) s 268(1). 
Note also s 268(2) which provides a modified test in respect of future debts (ie where the creditor has based the 
petition on a debt owed in the future). 
90 United Kingdom Insolvency Law Review Committee, Report on Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 8558, 
Her Majesty’s Printing Office, London, 1982, 535. 
Walton notes that while the Cork Committee failed in its aim of creating a unified test of 
insolvency applicable to individual and corporate debtors, 91  the resultant legislation did 
succeed in establishing a requirement (in both corporate and individual insolvencies) for 
proof that a debtor is, as a matter of fact, unable to pay his or her debts.92  
So while the concept of an act of bankruptcy perished following the Cork Committee review, 
the act of bankruptcy survived Australia’s own review of its bankruptcy laws (culminating  in 
the Harmer report of 1988 (the “Harmer Report”)) 93 .  The Harmer Report specifically 
recommended that the act of bankruptcy be abolished, preferring instead proof of insolvency 
by reference to “observable and limited presumptive evidence of that state”.94  It criticised 
the concept of the act of bankruptcy as an unnecessarily complicated, lengthy and costly 
process when the act of bankruptcy being relied upon was a failure to comply with a 
bankruptcy notice (most commonly relied upon by creditors).95  Further it went on to argue 
that the requirement for an act of bankruptcy mirrored the 16th century origins of bankruptcy 
law, requiring some act of notoriety tending to establish that the debtor was in fact insolvent, 
and noting that many acts of bankruptcy are “ancient in origin, largely irrelevant and rarely, if 
ever, used.”96  The Harmer Report recommended a simpler less time consuming mechanism, 
which would require a creditor to establish insolvency of a debtor on the grounds of (i) failure 
to comply with statutory demand; 97 (ii) unsatisfied execution of a judgment against the 
property of a debtor; or (iii) departure from or remaining out of Australia by a debtor with the 
intention of defeating, delaying or obstructing a creditor. 98   Notwithstanding these 
recommendations, Australia’s bankruptcy régime continues to eschew identifiable and 
verifiable proof of insolvency at the time a petition is presented.  In respect of a creditor’s 
petition and the act of bankruptcy, this raises another related point.  
C. Acts of bankruptcy: the doctrine of relation back 
The act of bankruptcy is not only a requirement for a creditor’s petition; it also dictates the 
date of the commencement of the bankruptcy and is the basis for (amongst other things) the 
doctrine of relation back.99  The date of commencement of the bankruptcy is, in the case of a 
creditor’s petition, the earliest act of bankruptcy within the period of six months prior to the 
presentation of the creditor’s petition.100  In the case of a debtor’s petition (and assuming that 
the debtor has committed an identifiable act of bankruptcy) an act of bankruptcy can also 
                                                          
91 For instance Walton notes (above n 82, 219) that the test of being unable to pay debts differs in respect of 
individuals and companies and indeed in respect of individuals, it depends on the identity of the petitioner.  
92 Walton, above n 82, 219. In BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail [2013] UKSC 28, the UK 
Supreme Court considered the legislative history of the Insolvency Act 1986 (England and Wales and Scotland) 
s 123 and the cash flow and balance sheet tests for insolvency. At [37] Lord Walker discussed the limitations of 
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93 Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Enquiry, Report No 45 (1988). 
94 Ibid 368. 
95 Ibid 360. 
96 Ibid 363. 
97 Note that the Harmer Report specifically recommended that a statutory demand be supported by a judgement. 
98 Law Reform Commission, above n 93, 365. 
99 The commencement date is also the reference date in relation to the voidable transaction provisions.  
100 Bankruptcy Act s 115(1). 
dictate the commencement of the bankruptcy.101  The practical effect of an act of bankruptcy 
is that while the date of bankruptcy (the formal date upon which the sequestration order is 
made or the debtor’s petition is accepted) dictates when the property of the bankrupt vests in 
the trustee in bankruptcy,102 the property that so vests is all property held by the bankrupt at 
the commencement of the bankruptcy, and any property acquired by the bankrupt after the 
commencement of the bankruptcy but prior to the date of discharge. 103   So the 
commencement of the bankruptcy marks the time at which the items of property which vest 
in the trustee constituting the “property of the bankrupt” are to be identified.104  This is 
known as the doctrine of relation back. 
Australia retains this doctrine notwithstanding that it has been abolished in the United 
Kingdom105 and New Zealand106 (both of which deem bankruptcy to commence on the date 
that the bankruptcy order is made). 107   The doctrine of relation back was also heavily 
criticized in the Harmer Report, which referred to it as a “fictitious, artificial and abstract 
concept and rarely understood”108 and the report noted that the submissions made to the 
enquiry were generally in support of removing this doctrine.  It went on to recommend that 
bankruptcy should (in the case of creditor’s petitions), commence on the date that the order is 
made.109   
There is some merit in these criticisms.  In effect, the doctrine deems the bankruptcy to have 
commenced at an earlier point than it actually did.110  Further as case law has previously 
identified,111 the doctrine of relation back creates an artificial construct which results in all 
property of the bankrupt at the date of commencement of the bankruptcy theoretically vesting 
in the trustee, such that any alienation of that property in that period is an alienation of the 
property that belongs to the estate and not the debtor and liable therefore to be set aside.112  
                                                          
101 Bankruptcy Act s 115(2) which provides for commencement in respect of a debtor’s petition: under court 
direction, the commencement date will be the date specified by the court;  if  the  petition was presented when at 
least one creditor’s petition is pending against the debtor and the debtors petition is accepted without court 
direction, the commencement date will be the date of the earliest act of bankruptcy upon which any of the 
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102 See Bankruptcy Act s 58(1). 
103 Bankruptcy Act s 116 (1)(a). 
104 Anscor Pty Ltd v Clout (2004) 135 FCR 469, 481 per Lindgren J.  
105 However, see Nationwide Building Society v Wright [2010] 2 WLR 1097 which noted that there is a very 
limited doctrine, being a restriction on dispositions during the period between the presentation of the bankruptcy 
petition and the vesting of the bankrupt’s estate in the trustee.  
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more than three months prior to the date of the presentation of the petition) as the basis of a creditor’s petition: 
see Insolvency Act 2006 (NZ) s 16(1). 
107 Insolvency Act 1986 (England and Wales) s 278 (a) (when the order is made) and Insolvency Act 2006 (NZ) s 
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108 Law Reform Commission, above n 93, 697. 
109 Ibid 398. 
110 Ibid 696. 
111 Unlike antecedent property transactions that require a specific quality or circumstance to a transfer before it 
can be set aside: see Bankruptcy Act 1966 ss 120-122.  
112 Re Docker (1938) 10 ABC 198. 
However, in a practical sense, the doctrine is subject to quite broad exceptions such that a 
person who acquires property from a bankrupt in the relation back period is protected if they 
can show that the transfer was at market value (if it was a conveyance or transfer of 
property), the transferee did not have notice of presentation of a petition when the transaction 
was made, and the transaction was made in good faith and in the ordinary course of 
business.113  The Harmer Report noted that in reality the doctrine was rarely relied upon, and 
subject to the strengthening of the antecedent property transaction provisions, its loss would 
be not be significant.  In the same respect, Taylor notes that it is the very overlap of the 
relation back period and the antecedent property transaction provisions which led New 
Zealand to abolish the former, noting in particular the government’s view that it does not 
serve anyone to have two sets of rules serving the same purpose.114 
This criticism calls into question the need for this additional level of complexity and rules.  
The various antecedent property provisions dealing with transactions for undervalue; 115  
transfers to defeat creditors;116 and preferences117 already provide a comprehensive regime 
for the trustee to undo transactions where they should not stand to the detriment of creditors.  
These give the trustee an ability to look back a number of years and challenge transactions 
and have property recovered, including (but not limited to) during the relation back period.  
They enable the  trustee  to overturn certain transactions, where it would be against public 
policy to deprive the bankrupt’s creditors from the proceeds of the relevant assets, providing  
a set of principles and grounds on which it will be deemed appropriate to reclaim property.  
Now that the United Kingdom has removed the act of bankruptcy and the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand have both removed the doctrine of relation back, there are strong 
arguments to re-visit the Harmer Report’s recommendations.  
This would have the benefit of simplifying and streamlining the bankruptcy procedure, 
removing two concepts from Australian bankruptcy law, one a relic from a past approach to 
bankruptcy, the other an unnecessary level of complexity.  It would also go one step closer to 
harmonising the Australian and New Zealand regimes, with harmonisation and coordination 
of business law being a key goal of the various Trans-Tasman agreements.118  It has been 
noted that although these memoranda do not necessarily mean adoption of identical laws, the 
aim is that regard shall be had to whether there are sound commercial reasons for particular 
laws to be different.119   
A stated aim in respect of amendments to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) has been for a more 
streamlined, modern and efficient bankruptcy régime (albeit one that adequately protects both 
                                                          
113 Bankruptcy Act s 123(1). 
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9 Insolvency Law Journal 105, 106.  
115 Bankruptcy Act s 120. 
116 Bankruptcy Act s 121. 
117 Bankruptcy Act s 122. 
118 See for example Memorandum of Understanding Between  the Government of New Zealand and the 
Government of Australia on the Coordination of Business Law (December 2013)  
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119 Brown above n 85, 151.  
creditors and debtors).120 With the release of the World Bank Report, it is timely for policy-
makers to consider reviewing this fundamental concept in Australia’s bankruptcy law that is 
out of step with similar jurisdictions that have undergone reform in these areas.   
 
IV. LIQUIDATION OF ESTATE AND DISCHARGE: TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY HOME  
 
A second area in which policy-makers may consider whether Australia’s regime would 
benefit from consideration of different approaches in other jurisdictions is whether there 
should be some form of exemption from the divisible estate for the family home.121  It is 
interesting that the Report in referring to the human side of insolvency states: 
Debtors’ homes are usually their most valuable asset, and in many cases, the asset in which 
debtors have lost the most equity. It is arguably also the most important asset psychologically, 
for the home provides shelter for the family and serves as the family meeting point. Thus, 
losing one’s home in foreclosure or insolvency can take a significant toll on a debtor. The 
family home is thus arguably one of the most important assets to be protected.122 
The Report also noted that some countries have developed some forms of temporary 
protection measures (in the context of both mortgage foreclosures and insolvency cases), 
recognising the value of home ownership to both human wellbeing,123 as well as broader 
economic considerations, such as the cost of providing alternative accommodation, and the 
impact of large scale foreclosures.124   
A. Rehabilitation and the Treatment of the Family Home in Bankruptcy  
While the bankrupt’s creditors will likely view the bankrupt’s home merely as a valuable 
financial asset, to the bankrupt (and indeed the bankrupt’s family), the family home is 
something much more than simply an asset with a particular financial value.  As a result, the 
family home frequently becomes a source of conflict between the competing interests in 
bankruptcy. 125   It is therefore noteworthy that the home is not recognised as a special 
category of asset in Australia and enjoys no direct protection under the bankruptcy regime.  
Instead, it simply forms part of the property of the bankrupt that will vest in the trustee on 
bankruptcy.126  By failing to give the family home special status or protection in the context 
of claims by creditors, this can result in entire families being displaced with repercussions not 
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121 World Bank Report above n 6, [232]. 
122 Ibid [240]. 
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124 World Bank Report above n 6, [332].   
125 Lee Steyn, ‘Treatment of a Debtor’s Home in Insolvency: Comparative Perspectives and Potential 
Developments in South Africa’ (2013) 22 International Insolvency Review 144, 145. 
126 Bankruptcy Act s 116.  
only for the particular family but for the wider society.127  Following the release of the World 
Bank Report, should Australian policy-makers and scholars consider placing the home in a 
special category of asset in bankruptcy, and should Australian bankruptcy law seek to protect 
the family home, or at least some element of value in it, by way of a homestead exemption?   
B. The Home beyond its value as a capital asset 
To deal with the home by way of simply aggregating it in with all other assets, ignores the 
unique character of the home apropos the debtor and the debtor’s family and the emotional 
and financial cost on the bankrupt and the bankrupt’s family of losing the home. To consider 
the home as a separate and unique asset, one must of course consider what it is that gives the 
home this character.  Fox128 analyses the differing “values” that a home might have.  She 
recognises 4 fundamental ones: (i) home as a physical structure; (ii) home as a territory; (iii) 
home as a means of identity and self-identity for its occupiers; and (iv) home as a social and 
cultural phenomenon.  So in this sense, the home provides things to its occupiers that are not 
always capable of clear enunciation but nevertheless provide an essential and powerful role in 
their daily life.  In arguing that the family home should be afforded a level of protection 
under bankruptcy law in Australia, Altobelli129 focuses on the security (both physical and 
emotional) that the home provides to families, acting as the cornerstone of the family unit and 
impacting on the economic wellbeing of the family.   
As a result, the emotional and social cost of losing the family home can be considerable, not 
just for the bankrupt, but also for the bankrupt’s family.130 This can result in incredible 
hardship for all the occupiers of the home, not least of which the children, who lose not only 
the physical needs of space and shelter, but also the focal point of their lives.131  The loss of 
the family home can lead to family breakdowns, periods of uncertainty and insecurity, 
increased reliance upon social welfare and an increased risk of homelessness, when no 
alternative living arrangement can be found.  
The bankrupt’s home therefore is frequently the source of conflict within a bankruptcy due to 
the desire of creditors to target this valuable asset.132  The problem is trying to balance the 
interests of the occupiers, with those of the creditors however, there is a conceptual problem 
with balancing these conflicts.  As Fox notes, there has been insufficient development in 
respect of enunciating socio-legal recognition of the special nature of the home (over and 
above its conception as a capital asset with a set value).133  This creates the risk that any 
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1.   
128 Lorna Fox, ‘The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge?’ (2002) 29(4) Journal of 
Law and Society 580, 581. 
129 Altobelli, above n 127, 4-8. 
130 For an interesting study in relation to the foreclosure crisis in the USA, see G Thomas Kingsley, Robin 
Smith, and David Price, The Impact of Foreclosures on Families and Communities. Washington D.C. (The 
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132 Steyn, above n 125, 145. 
133 Fox, above n 128, 596. 
discussion of an interest that an occupier might have in a property over and above its 
conception as a capital asset, will simply be reduced to the realm of sentiment or emotion, 
which risks being trivialized, or considered uncomfortable territory for legal analysis, with 
the inevitable result that the claims and interests of creditors often triumph.  As Moore notes, 
the concept of ‘home’ is difficult to explicitly define and manipulate.134  Consequently, it 
may be too easy to subjugate these values to the easily identifiable financial interests of the 
creditors. 
It is this dichotomy which lies at the heart of the problems surrounding the family home.  
Without some formal recognition of the interests in the home beyond the potential financial 
return to creditors, it seems difficult to imagine that the true interests are being balanced 
appropriately.  This discussion is relevant both to circumstances where the courts have to 
decide where the balance lies in a dispute between occupiers and a creditor looking to realise 
the family home, as well as broader policy discussions surrounding home protection 
measures and the importance of the family home to the aims of rehabilitation.  
C. Protecting the Family Home: Some Examples  
1 International experience 
Notwithstanding Fox’s concerns many jurisdictions have recognised the importance of the 
family home by developing some form of home protection measures for occupiers when the 
legal owner of the property becomes a bankrupt.135  These vary greatly in their nature from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction so it is not possible to identify a common approach.136  They range 
from formal homestead exemptions in the USA and Canada137 to procedural requirements 
imposed on trustees seeking to sell.138  For instance, England and Wales have introduced 
measures that include requiring a court order to effect the sale of the land and giving the 
courts the power to postpone the sale of the home by the trustee,139 as well as giving non-
bankrupt spouses who have acquired statutory rights of occupation (under the family law 
provisions) the right to enforce those as against the trustee.140  It is notable that in this 
respect, the bankruptcy laws of England and Wales specifically target the home as a special 
category of asset.  Amongst New Zealand’s measures, a spouse whose name is not on the 
legal title can, in some circumstances, claim a “protected interest” in the proceeds of sale in 
an amount equal to half the equity in the home up to a maximum sum of $103,000.141  
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135 World Bank Report above n 6, [241]. 
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140 Insolvency Act 1996 (England and Wales) s 336. 
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2 Australia 
In Australia, there is no specific protection afforded to bankrupts or occupiers under the 
bankruptcy legislation.  If the bankrupt is the sole owner, and no other person has an interest 
(legal or equitable) in the property, neither the bankrupt nor the bankrupt’s family has any 
right to remain in possession of the home.  If the home was jointly owned by the bankrupt 
and the non-bankrupt spouse, the joint tenancy severs as a matter of law, and the non-
bankrupt spouse’s interest remains as a tenant in common with the trustee (as a result of the 
interest of the bankrupt vesting in the trustee).142  While the trustee will usually give the non-
bankrupt spouse the opportunity to purchase the trustee’s share, if the non-bankrupt spouse 
cannot, the trustee can apply for a court order to sell the property.143  If the non-bankrupt 
spouse has no legal title, they still may be able to claim some equitable interest in the 
property (or a part of the property), either by way of express or constructive trust, with such 
interest being able to be raised as against the trustee.144  Likewise, any order made in respect 
of the property under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) prior to the bankruptcy will continue to 
bind the trustee145 and property settlement orders under s79 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) can 
be made against property that has vested in the trustee146 and a spouse can also claim legal or 
equitable rights under pursuant to s78 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as against the trustee.147  
Nevertheless, there is no protection specifically directed at the family home.  These 
protections apply to all property, not simply the home, so they do not represent an attempt to 
create a regime to recognise the unique nature of the home.  At best the non-bankrupt 
spouse’s interest in the proceeds of sale148 will likely be preserved.  These protections would 
not prevent a forced sale of the home itself and they do not protect any value of the 
bankrupt’s interest in the home as against the trustee.  
D. Protecting the family home: The interaction of the goal of rehabilitation  
The lack of specific home protection not only represents a regime failure to recognise the 
particular nature of the home, but it also runs counter to one of the central themes of 
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bankruptcy, that is rehabilitation.  Traditionally the law concerning debtors was underpinned 
by a quasi-criminalisation of debt (as well as a significant social and moral stigma)149 with 
the aim of bankruptcy law to ultimately deter default and punish defaulters.150  While the 
laws regarding debtors and bankruptcy may well have moved away from the formal concepts 
of punishment, 151 bankruptcy procedures may be seen as a means of debt recovery for 
creditors.  However, the World Bank Report states a principal purpose of a personal 
insolvency regime is “economic rehabilitation”.152  
The fresh start available to a bankrupt is found within the concept of discharge.  Immediately 
upon becoming bankrupt, a debtor obtains protection from creditors enforcing their debts.153  
The practical effect is that a bankrupt (subject to some exceptions) is no longer obliged (or 
able) to pay his or her debts (with the creditors having to prove in and recover against the 
bankrupt’s estate) and is formally released from those debts on discharge from bankruptcy.154  
Discharge is directly related to the idea of rehabilitation and a fresh start enabling the debtor 
to rehabilitate into the credit community, and to live, trade and participate in normal everyday 
life155  
While rehabilitation through discharge has been recognised as a fundamental goal of 
bankruptcy law,156 the practical ability of the bankrupt to return to a normal life and make a 
fresh start requires consideration. 157  Australian bankruptcy law exempts some forms of 
property158 in order both to maintain some way of life during bankruptcy as well as to assist a 
bankrupt in achieving a fresh start through the retention of property to a modest value.  This 
has been seen by the courts as “a desirable exception to the general rule that all the 
bankrupt’s property is divisible among his or her creditors”. 159   In promoting the 
rehabilitation of the bankrupt, should there be an exemption, and if so to what extent, in 
respect of a family home.  
E. Is it time to open the door to a homestead exemption?  
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Herald (online), 25 March 2012 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/going-bust-a-new-start-but-tough-life-
20120324-1vqs4.html>.   
158 These include certain household property, property used as a means of transport and property used to earn 
income (in each case up to proscribed levels) see Bankruptcy Act s 116(2).  
159 Tiver v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2010) 269 ALR 522, 532 per Besanko J. 
The concept of a “homestead exemption” is one which is recognised in North America, but 
has not been adopted outside of the USA and Canada.  As a result, jurisdictions such as 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, maintain the basic position that the interest 
of the bankrupt in the bankrupt’s home prima facie, vests in the trustee upon bankruptcy.  The 
principle of a homestead exemption is that some value of the bankrupt’s interest in his or her 
home is exempted from the bankrupt’s estate and does not form part of the assets available to 
the trustee in order to settle the debts of the bankrupt.  In the USA, the federal Bankruptcy 
Code provides for an exemption not to exceed $15,000 in value in the equity of the 
bankrupt’s home where it is used as a residence.160  However, as states can opt out of this and 
apply their own level of exemption, the value of the exemption varies greatly from state to 
state, ranging from an unlimited dollar value exemption to no exemption at all.161  Likewise 
in Canada, federal law provides for the sheltering of certain exempt assets (including an 
amount of equity in a bankrupt’s residence), but, like the USA the actual levels of exemption 
are a matter for each province and therefore vary from province to province.162  
The homestead exemption will not necessarily prevent the home from being sold, particularly 
if the relevant exempt amount is less than the overall equity in the home.163  However, even if 
the home is sold, that protected portion of the proceeds will not revert to the trustee, it will 
instead revert to the bankrupt who can then use it to purchase another home or at least 
towards the provision of other suitable accommodation.164  Therefore, even if the concept of 
‘home’ as discussed is lost, the bankrupt is still given the means to source an alternative 
home with funds that would otherwise have been distributed amongst the creditors.165   
The US homestead exemption has been described as a means to “prevent private destitution 
and hardship, to support and stabilize the home and family unit, and to prevent impecunious 
debtors from burdening the public purse by resorting to charity and welfare programs”.166  
The financial, psychological and social cost of losing one’s home, without any form of safety 
net would appear to be a considerable hurdle to the debtor’s rehabilitation.  It has been noted 
(in support of a homestead exemption) that taking a family home simply makes the family 
homeless and miserable, and creates deleterious effects on the family as a unit, and the 
relationships within it.167  
                                                          
160 Bankruptcy Code s 522(d)(1).   
161 Steyn, above n 125, 149. 
162 Benjamin Geva and Stephanie Ben-Ishai, ‘Canada: The Origins of Canadian Bankruptcy Exemptions: 
Federalism, the Relevance of US Law and the Prospects for Reform’ (2009) 20 Journal of Banking and Finance 
Law and Practice 270. 
163 Steyn, above n 125, 149. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Lewis refers to the very different position of the discharged bankrupt in America, who may (depending on 
the bankrupt’s state of residence) have retained some value in the family home, or even the entire home itself, to 
that in Australia and argues this reflects the significant and broad focus on a fresh start as the focus of 
bankruptcy law in America: Paul Lewis, ‘The Future of Personal Bankruptcy: A Comparative Analysis – Part 1’ 
(2004) 5 Insolvency Law Bulletin 33.  
166 In re Johnson, 124 BR 290 (BankrDMinn 1991), 296. 
167 Harry D Boul, ‘The Need for a Rational Homestead Exemption in Missouri’ (2013) 69 Journal of the 
Missouri Bar 264, 266. 
However, the concept of a homestead exemption is not without criticism.  It is considered 
unfair on creditors who have been left out of pocket, particularly those whose debts have 
been used in the purchase or maintenance of the property.  As Wilson notes, many American 
commentators criticise the Texas homestead exemption (which is an unlimited amount) as 
being simply a means for wealthy debtors to escape liability in bankruptcy168 and Barros 
notes that, at least in those jurisdictions with unlimited exemptions, the doctrine operates to 
over-protect the interests of the home at the expense of creditors’ interests. 169  The very 
nature of a homestead exemption is such that it does specifically favour the interests of 
occupiers over creditors to some extent, so the issue for Australia would be to arrive at a 
(national) level of exemption that while recognising the interests of the creditors, provides an 
adequate level of exemption in order to facilitate the stated aim of rehabilitation.170   
Of course any discussion regarding homestead exemptions (and indeed most other forms of 
home protection measures) must be tempered by the realisation that the existence of a secured 
creditor will necessarily affect the position of the family home.  Australian bankruptcy law 
specifically protects secured creditors in the event of bankruptcy, preserving a secured 
creditor’s rights to deal with, and enforce its security.171  The practical effect of this is that 
the secured creditor has the freedom to deal with the secured property, and this commonly 
entails the mortgagee exercising its rights to take possession and affect a forced sale.172  In 
this situation, the home will in effect, cease to be an asset available for distribution amongst 
the other creditors.173   
F. Summary 
It seems to be an anomaly in a country such as Australia where home ownership is so highly 
valued,174 that the home, with all its antecedent qualities and values, does not enjoy specific 
recognition as a special category of asset when a debtor becomes bankrupt.  By treating the 
home as simply another asset, the personal insolvency regime is failing to properly address 
the place of the home in family and social life.  If we are to continue to focus on 
rehabilitation and a fresh start  it is important to consider what role a homestead exemption 
could have in achieving that aim in Australia.  As noted, the loss of the family home can have 
a devastating impact on both the bankrupt and the bankrupt’s family which can impact the 
                                                          
168 Allen Wilson, ‘More than just a Boon: How Texas Homestead Law Helped Insulate Texas from the 
Foreclosure Typhoon’ (2012) 64 Baylor Law Review 999. 
169 D Benjamin Barros, ‘Home as a Legal Concept’ (2006) 46 Santa Clara Law Review 255, 285. 
170 More detailed discussion of the issues and consequences involved in the introduction of such an exemption 
are beyond the scope of the present article and merit more detailed research, in particular into ‘unintended 
consequences’ and ‘moral hazard’.  
171 Bankruptcy Act s 58(5). The ability to securitise debt is essential to the provision of credit in Australia, and 
the removal of this protection would likely affect the availability of credit.   
172 As to the options open to a secured creditor, see Lewis and Rose above n 149, 108-109 and the summary of a 
secured creditor’s options pursuant to Bankruptcy Act s 58(5) and s 90. 
173 However, note that the balance (if any) of the proceeds of sale, after the mortgage has been satisfied in full, 
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174 The Bureau of Statistics estimates that since the 1966 census, the level of home ownership has ranged 
between 68% and 70% of home occupiers: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012 Australian Year Book Cat No 
1301 (online) 
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1>. 
ability of the bankrupt to rebuild his or her life.  Beyond just focusing on the impact on 
occupier’s personally, there is the also the social element, including the ongoing cost to 
society of people being made homeless, the breakdown in family life and the cost of the 
provision of support services to those affected.175  The release of the World Bank Report 
provides an opportunity for policy-makers to debate the relevance of some form of 
homestead exemption to support the goal of debtor rehabilitation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This brief overview of the Australian personal insolvency law against the background of the 
World Bank Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons with its core 
attributes for an effective insolvency regime for natural persons shows that the Australian 
regime already addresses many of these attributes. 
The Report usefully adopts a perspective that concentrates on the human side of insolvency – 
on the implications for individuals of overwhelming debt.  When talking of debt relief, it 
notes “the desire to relieve individual suffering is more direct and more central in the context 
of natural person insolvency”.176  
In that context, two areas have been identified through the review whereby the World Bank’s 
fundamental concern for equity highlights matters worthy of consideration by policy-makers 
and scholars to improve Australian personal insolvency law.  These are, the removal of acts 
of bankruptcy from the Australian regime and the consideration of limited special treatment 
of the home within the bankrupt’s estate, for the purposes of enhancing economic 
rehabilitation and the notion of a fresh start, particularly from the perspective of addressing 
the morbidity aspects of excessive debt.  
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